Government forces are reported to have captured Al-Labnat (Labanat) camp in Al-Jawf on 7 September. Completed-capture accounts followed the earlier encirclement and partial-entry reports. MarebPress also reports a named Nation Shield commander saying the forces had passed the camp and continued advancing. The camp’s reported fall extends the latest government gains into Al-Jawf. Al-Wattan, Ajel, MarebPress.
The other clearest recent loss reports concern Hays in southern Al Hodeidah and the heights around Al-Mafalis in Hayfan, southern Taiz. Western Taiz is moving in both directions: a Houthi breakthrough on the Taiz–Mokha road was followed by government recoveries. Saba: Hays, Saba: Hayfan, Yemen Monitor.
Latest evidence check: 7 September 2026, 15:27 Yemen / 1227Z. Al-Labnat has been updated to reported government capture; the earlier reports remain in the source chronology.
Assessment: 1 January–7 September 2026. The map below separates the broad control picture from the places where fresh gains are being reported. Every mapped report carries its source, date and geographic limits. The dated January colors stay visible beneath the report outlines; a local battle does not erase the historical control of an entire district.
January’s big government gains were against the STC
The first correction matters for the entire map. Government forces recovered large areas of southern and eastern Yemen in January from the Southern Transitional Council. Counting those areas as Houthi losses would give the wrong starting point. ACLED, 9 February.
The Houthi–government front was much less mobile through the first half of the year. Sana’a Center’s January–March review describes largely unchanged lines. Its April–June review finds no significant territorial exchange; the same review’s update also records no significant gains from the 3–6 July fighting in Hudaydah. These are regional assessments. A hill or checkpoint can change hands without moving that national picture. January–March review, April–June review.
By 19 August, ACLED was reporting more clashes and strikes, but no serious push by either side to take territory. There were local reversals: two Hayfan positions reportedly fell briefly to the Houthis on 12–13 August and were recovered. That sequence establishes a recovery, not an additional gain over January’s position. ACLED, Al-Mashhad.
Hays: the city was already government-held
Hays is the clearest district-level case in the September reporting. On 5 September, the government’s Saba news agency said the armed forces and Joint Forces had secured the district’s countryside. Its statement explicitly says Hays city was already under their control. Saba.
The change concerns the rural belt and surrounding positions. Reports name Wadi Nakhla, Al-Fash, Dubas and Saqam, with advances toward the southern approaches to Al-Jarrahi. Some positions were recovered after the opening Houthi attack. The reporting supports government expansion and consolidation around Hays; it does not establish that the entire district was newly taken from the Houthis in September. Sheba Intelligence, 5 September, EFE, 6 September.
Hays is green on the map because district-wide government control has been reported. Green does not mean every part was newly captured. The Hodeidah governor also claimed control of Saqam, Al-Fash and Al-Barasha heights during a 6 September visit. The exact hill extents remain unresolved. Governor statement via 2 December. The separate Al-Jarrahi outline locates the next reported axis of advance. There is insufficient evidence here to color Al-Jarrahi town, or the whole district, as captured.
Hayfan: five claimed heights, no whole-district capture
On 5 September, the Fourth Hazm Brigade reported taking five heights around Al-Mafalis in Hayfan: Al-Wathrah, Saeed Taha, Dhiban, Al-Khudayrah and Al-Najdayn. The statement places them above Souq Al-Khazjah and nearby routes. Saba.
That is a specific claim about tactical ground. The available material does not establish the boundaries of those heights, and it does not say all of Hayfan changed hands. The orange outline therefore identifies the district containing the report. It is not a drawing of five captured hills.
Western Taiz: the Houthis also gained ground
The Kadhah–Sharajah corridor is where a simple government-advance map breaks down. Early reporting described successful resistance to a Houthi attempt to sever the route between Taiz and the western coast. A later breakthrough on 5 September cut the Taiz–Mokha asphalt road. Reports then described government recoveries, while other accounts still placed Houthi forces at junctions and nearby positions. Yemen Monitor, 6 September, 7 September.
The geographic context spans northwestern Al-Maafir, northern Mawza and southwestern Maqbanah, with related fighting around Jabal Habashi and the Al-Barh approaches. That places the reporting in a corridor. It does not supply a precise current contact line. Al Jazeera Arabic.
A field-source account published on 6 September at 22:33 site time says government forces recovered Kadhah junction and advanced toward Sharajah checkpoint. That is a junction-recovery claim, not evidence that the entire Taiz–Mokha road was reopened. Bawabatii.
A further 7 September report says government forces recovered Jabal Al-Kurah and its checkpoint, with fighting continuing nearby. That remains an attributed recovery claim. It does not establish complete government control of the corridor, Al-Barh town or every surrounding height. The fresh National Resistance reporting still describes heavy fighting on the Al-Barh front. The purple outlines keep that uncertainty visible. 7 September update. Ajel.
Al-Labnat (Labanat): reported captured on 7 September
The latest reviewed reporting describes government control of the camp. Aden Al-Ghad and Al-Wattan report that capture followed the seizure of surrounding defensive positions and an encirclement. Ajel, citing Al-Arabiya sources, also reports entry and control. MarebPress’s 13:00 site-time report attributes a statement to Brigadier General Adnan Raziq al-Qumayshi, commander of the Third Nation Shield Division, saying government forces had passed Al-Labnat and continued advancing. Aden Al-Ghad, Al-Wattan, Ajel, MarebPress.
Okaz’s later military-source report also describes the camp as captured. The Al-Wattan and Aden Al-Ghad accounts overlap closely and count as one source chain. Okaz.
The current classification is reported government capture on 7 September. The earlier Al-Masdar report of large parts taken, and the earlier encirclement account, stay in the chronology. They should not freeze the map at the entry stage after subsequent capture reporting. The September 5 strike statement remains a separate event; a strike alone never established occupation. Earlier partial-entry report, encirclement report, Saba strike statement.
The capture is still attributed reporting. The commander’s described video was not independently authenticated, and the camp’s exact perimeter was not established. No capture of Al-Hazm city is established. The map uses Al-Hazm only as a regional reference; the outline does not assert that the camp lies within that district. An Al Jazeera liveblog entry published at 11:45 UTC still described attempts to encircle Al-Labnat, without giving a separate event time or reporting a reversal. That discrepancy remains unresolved. Al Jazeera liveblog.
Haradh, Marib and Al-Bayda: reports without mapped gains
The evidence threshold is the same elsewhere. A government offensive in Haradh on 7 September now includes reports of fighting in the city centre. That still does not establish completed capture of the city. 24 Post. Reports of position gains at Al-Kassarah northwest of Marib, and unspecified advances in Al-Bayda, do not provide sufficiently located footprints for new control polygons. Those developments belong in the evidence register, with their limits attached. Haradh, Marib, Al-Bayda.
Where the Houthis still hold, and what this map means
The inherited national overview places the Houthi-held northwest, including Sana’a, in red. Government and aligned areas across much of the south and east are blue. Those broad areas come from the 11 January 2026 published control map, read alongside the subsequent regional assessments. Government-aligned forces are grouped for this view; the color does not imply one command chain. January control map, Sana’a Center.
This is a dated regional assessment, not a surveyed September frontline. Red and blue remain the January baseline beneath the dated report outlines. That preserves the historical picture without pretending every position is still held. Gray covers areas unassigned by the source overview or boundary matching. Orange and purple outlines locate reports and unresolved current edges; they never measure captured land.
There is no defensible cumulative square-kilometre total for Houthi losses in this material. The missing piece is measured change on the ground, with reliable before-and-after boundaries. Adding up whole districts would count land that was already government-held and turn incomplete claims into false precision.
The downloadable KML preserves that distinction, including an optional January reference, governorate and district boundaries, and dated source records. The interactive date slider and playback move through the baseline and dated reports. Hays turns green from its reported district-control date; later claims appear when reported. No frontlines are interpolated between observations.
Sources, mapping and reuse
The research compares original government statements with regional reporting and longer-period assessments. Saba is an interested government source. Syndications of the same military statement, AFP dispatch or Al-Arabiya account are treated as the same source chain. Search-index-only access, changed article versions and unresolved claims are identified in the dated source register.
Control geometry is adapted from Ali Zifan, BorysMapping/Borysk5, Ecrusized and Wikimedia Commons contributors, Yemeni Civil War.svg, under CC BY-SA 4.0, using the underlying NordNordWest location map. The adaptation extracts, georeferences, generalizes and recolors the area fills, clips them to the country boundary and adds dated overlays. Some inputs to the January Houthi outline date to December 2025.
Administrative boundaries come from the Central Statistical Organization and OCHA Yemen/FISS through HDX COD-AB, under CC BY 3.0 IGO. They were edited in October 2023 and reviewed in December 2024. They define administrative areas, not the front. Attribution and boundaries imply no endorsement by those organizations or the map’s original contributors.
7 September 2026 · 14:03:35 UTC — Al-Kadha front
Shin’s post, citing the Yemeni Armed Forces
Yemeni armed forces repel the Houthi militias and take control of Naqil and Jabal Al-Koura in the Al-Kadha front, west of the city of Taiz.
- Yemeni Armed Forces
The reported gain concerns al-Koura pass and mountain. It does not establish capture of all Maqbanah district, and the report supplies no mapped perimeter for the gain.
7 September 2026 · 14:15:09 UTC — Al-Bayda
Shin’s post, citing the Yemeni Armed Forces
"Yemeni armed forces liberated the Haid Al-Khizan and Al-Falihan positions, advancing all the way to the Al-Nasifah sub-district and its first village, Dhi Amkhashab, in Al-Bayda Governorate."
- Yemeni Armed Forces
Haid Al-Khizan and Al-Falihan are retained as written in the source; their original Arabic spelling has not been verified.
Historical geographic context: HRITC report, 8 August 2026.
The statement reports two captured positions and an advance to Al-Nasifah and Dhi Amkhashab. It does not establish control of the whole sub-district or Al-Bayda Governorate, or supply a mapped perimeter for the gain. The linked historical report provides location context only; it does not verify the 7 September advance.
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