U.S. Treasury sanctioned 14 individuals and five entities under 𝐎𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐄𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐨𝐦𝐢𝐜 𝐎𝐮𝐭𝐜𝐚𝐬𝐭, targeting networks supporting Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), Lebanese Hizballah, IRGC-QF procurement and sanctions evasion. OFAC also announced a $1,427,230 settlement and began denying the vast majority of pending Iran-specific license applications.

According to Treasury:

Individuals

Kata’ib Hizballah operatives
- 𝐀𝐥𝐢 𝐇𝐚𝐬𝐚𝐧 𝐅𝐚𝐫𝐡𝐚𝐧 𝐀𝐥-𝐋𝐚𝐦𝐢 — Iraq; senior KH commander acting for or on behalf of the U.S.-designated terrorist organization.
- 𝐇𝐮𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐢𝐧 𝐀𝐡𝐦𝐞𝐝 𝐇𝐮𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐢𝐧 𝐀𝐥-𝐃𝐡𝐮𝐡𝐚𝐢𝐛𝐚𝐰𝐢 — Iraq; active KH member.
- 𝐌𝐨𝐡𝐚𝐦𝐞𝐝 𝐀𝐦𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐅𝐚𝐝𝐡𝐢𝐥 𝐀𝐥𝐢 𝐀𝐥-𝐒𝐡𝐚𝐢𝐤𝐡𝐥𝐢 — Iraq; active KH member.
- 𝐊𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐚𝐫 𝐌𝐨𝐡𝐚𝐦𝐦𝐞𝐝 𝐐𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐦 𝐀𝐥-𝐇𝐫𝐚𝐢𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐰𝐢 — Iraq; active KH member.

PMF/PMC military procurement network
- 𝐀𝐛𝐛𝐚𝐬 𝐉𝐚𝐰𝐚𝐝 𝐊𝐚𝐝𝐡𝐢𝐦 𝐀𝐥-𝐓𝐚𝐦𝐞𝐞𝐦𝐢 — Iraq; senior Popular Mobilization Commission Directorate of Technical Equipment official who advises on foreign military purchases and enables support to the IRGC-QF.
- 𝐀𝐛𝐝𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐡 𝐍𝐚𝐝𝐡𝐢𝐦 𝐋𝐮𝐚𝐢𝐛𝐢 𝐀𝐥 𝐀𝐦𝐞𝐫𝐢 — UAE-based Iraqi arms dealer; founder and CEO of Al-Brouj, which supplies the PMC and supports military organizations operating under IRGC-QF direction, including helicopter maintenance.
- 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐝𝐨𝐨𝐧 𝐍𝐚𝐬𝐞𝐫 𝐌𝐚𝐫𝐲𝐨𝐨𝐬𝐡 𝐀𝐥-𝐀𝐛𝐚𝐝𝐚 — Iraq; representative of Ain Al-Iraq who coordinates foreign defense acquisitions and advises the PMC.

Iran-linked financial network
- 𝐌𝐚𝐣𝐢𝐝 𝐀𝐥𝐢 𝐀𝐤𝐛𝐚𝐫 𝐍𝐚𝐦𝐝𝐚𝐫 𝐀𝐥-𝐌𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐚𝐥𝐚𝐰𝐢 — Iraq/UAE-linked businessman; used Iraqi private banks and Shams & Bahr’s hawala network to remit millions of dollars from Iraq to Iran through the UAE.
- 𝐀𝐛𝐝𝐮𝐥𝐡𝐚𝐬𝐚𝐧 𝐀𝐥𝐢 𝐀. 𝐍𝐚𝐦𝐝𝐚𝐫 𝐀𝐥-𝐌𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐚𝐥𝐚𝐰𝐢 — Iraq/UAE-linked businessman; owner of Shams & Bahr and acted on its behalf.

Hizballah cash and gold network
- 𝐇𝐮𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐢𝐧 𝐈𝐛𝐫𝐚𝐡𝐢𝐦 — Lebanon; money exchanger who, with Abdallah Hamieh, transferred hundreds of millions of dollars from the IRGC-QF to Hizballah between May and September 2025.
- 𝐀𝐛𝐝𝐚𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐡 𝐇𝐚𝐦𝐢𝐞𝐡 — Lebanon; money exchanger involved in the same IRGC-QF-to-Hizballah transfer channel.
- 𝐆𝐡𝐚𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐇𝐮𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐢𝐧 𝐖𝐞𝐡𝐛𝐞 — Lebanon; Hizballah money courier who collected cash from exchangers for Hizballah financial officials.
- 𝐌𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐚𝐭 𝐉𝐚𝐦𝐢𝐥 𝐙𝐚𝐡𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐞 — Lebanon; sister and facilitator of designated Hizballah financier 𝐇𝐚𝐦𝐝𝐢 𝐙𝐚𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐄𝐥 𝐃𝐢𝐧𝐞; worked at YIM Exchange and held power of attorney at Gold Pro SARL.
- 𝐀𝐦𝐢𝐫 𝐀𝐥-𝐌𝐚𝐤𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐢 — Syria/Türkiye; operated a Syria-based gold exchange with Istanbul offices and obtained large-denomination currency through Lebanese exchange houses for 𝐇𝐚𝐦𝐝𝐢 𝐙𝐚𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐄𝐥 𝐃𝐢𝐧𝐞.

Entities

  • 𝐀𝐥-𝐁𝐫𝐨𝐮𝐣 𝐅𝐨𝐫 𝐆𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐋𝐭𝐝 — Iraq; Al Ameri-controlled procurement and services company supplying the PMC and IRGC-QF-directed Iraqi military organizations.
  • 𝐀𝐢𝐧 𝐀𝐥-𝐈𝐫𝐚𝐪 𝐅𝐨𝐫 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐓𝐞𝐜𝐡𝐧𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐠𝐲 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐀𝐮𝐝𝐢𝐨, 𝐕𝐢𝐬𝐮𝐚𝐥, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐒𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐋𝐭𝐝 — Iraq; PMC-affiliated defense procurement company used in Russia-, Iran-, and China-linked acquisitions, corruption, sanctions evasion, and attempted procurement of U.S. defense articles.
  • 𝐒𝐡𝐚𝐦𝐬 & 𝐁𝐚𝐡𝐫 𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 𝐋.𝐋.𝐂. — Dubai, UAE; hawala and exchange business that moved millions of dollars from Iraq to Iran through the UAE.
  • 𝐘𝐈𝐌 𝐄𝐱𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞 — Lebanon; exchange house controlled or directed by designated Hizballah financier 𝐇𝐚𝐦𝐝𝐢 𝐙𝐚𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐄𝐥 𝐃𝐢𝐧𝐞.
  • 𝐆𝐨𝐥𝐝 𝐏𝐫𝐨 𝐒𝐀𝐑𝐋 — Lebanon; Hamdi-controlled exchange used to purchase gold through Dubai hawalas and move it into Lebanon via couriers despite lacking a Lebanese central bank license to import gold.

Designation authorities

  • KH- and Hizballah-related designations were imposed under E.O. 13224, as amended.
  • Shams & Bahr and its two facilitators were designated under E.O. 13902 for operating in, or acting for an entity operating in, Iran’s financial sector.

Enforcement and policy changes

  • An unnamed individual agreed to pay $1,427,230 to settle potential civil liability for apparent violations involving management consulting and advisory services to a leading Iranian software company, receipt of Iranian-origin dividends into U.S. bank accounts, and acquisition of Iranian real estate.
  • OFAC’s new Iran Statement of Licensing Policy establishes a presumption of denial except where required by law or in limited circumstances, such as risks to life, limb, or environmental safety.
  • OFAC immediately began denying the vast majority of outstanding Iran-related specific-license applications.
  • FinCEN issued an Operation Economic Outcast Whistleblower Bulletin seeking information on Iranian proxies, facilitators, BSA violations, and sanctions evasion. Individuals voluntarily providing qualifying information may be eligible for awards.

Source: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0626/