Operation Economic Outcast targets Iran’s international shadow-banking architecture, foreign-currency access, and oil-revenue repatriation channels. OFAC designated an Iraqi bank, Iranian offshore banks, exchange houses, front companies, and 16 individuals; the State Department concurrently designated a Cuban bank servicing Iran’s Karafarin Bank.

Individuals:
- 𝐒𝐚𝐲𝐲𝐞𝐝 𝐑𝐮𝐡𝐨𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐡 𝐑𝐚𝐳𝐚𝐯𝐢 — Iranian national residing in Dubai; senior Iranian oil “trustee” who sold and shipped NIOC oil, repatriated proceeds through shell companies and cash/gold couriers, and worked with designated Hizballah financier and IRGC-QF facilitator Seyed Naiemaei Badroddin Moosavi.
- 𝐙𝐡𝐢𝐥𝐚 𝐌𝐨𝐡𝐚𝐦𝐦𝐚𝐝𝐢 — Location not specified; FSAQ employee involved in foreign-exchange operations supporting Iranian oil sellers and shadow-banking transactions.
- 𝐌𝐢𝐥𝐚𝐝 𝐊𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐛𝐢 — Location not specified; FSAQ employee involved in foreign-exchange operations.
- 𝐀𝐦𝐢𝐫 𝐒𝐚𝐛𝐞𝐭𝐢 — Location not specified; FSAQ employee involved in foreign-exchange operations.
- 𝐍𝐚𝐳𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐧 𝐁𝐨𝐫𝐣𝐢 — Location not specified; FSAQ employee involved in foreign-exchange operations.
- 𝐅𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐞𝐡 𝐕𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐠𝐡𝐢 𝐌𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐣𝐢 — Location not specified; FSAQ employee involved in foreign-exchange operations.
- 𝐀𝐳𝐚𝐝𝐞𝐡 𝐀𝐛𝐝𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐩𝐮𝐫 — Location not specified; FSAQ employee involved in foreign-exchange operations.
- 𝐅𝐚𝐫𝐳𝐚𝐝 𝐀𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐡𝐲𝐚𝐫 — Location not specified; FSAQ employee involved in foreign-exchange operations.
- 𝐒𝐚𝐝𝐞𝐠𝐡 𝐁𝐚𝐯𝐢 — Dominican/Iranian national; IRGC-QF facilitator, money launderer, weapons-procurement enabler, and operator of Bavi and Partners Exchange Company.
- 𝐒𝐞𝐲𝐲𝐞𝐝 𝐀𝐛𝐛𝐚𝐬 𝐇𝐨𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐢 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐬𝐚 — Iranian national; owner/operator of Hosseini Parsa Exchange and facilitator of shadow-banking activity for sanctioned Iranian banks.
- 𝐊𝐡𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐝 𝐌𝐨𝐡𝐢𝐞𝐬𝐧𝐞𝐣𝐚𝐝 — Iranian national; owner/operator of Hosseini Parsa Exchange.
- 𝐒𝐨𝐫𝐮𝐬𝐡 𝐍𝐚𝐣𝐚𝐟𝐳𝐚𝐝𝐞𝐡 — Iranian national; owner/operator of Najafzadeh Exchange, which processed hundreds of millions of dollars for Iranian financial institutions.
- 𝐒𝐨𝐡𝐞𝐢𝐥 𝐍𝐚𝐣𝐚𝐟𝐳𝐚𝐝𝐞𝐡 — Iranian national; owner/operator of Najafzadeh Exchange.
- 𝐌𝐚𝐧𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐡 𝐌𝐢𝐫𝐦𝐨𝐡𝐚𝐦𝐦𝐚𝐝𝐢 — Iranian national; operator acting on behalf of Najafzadeh Exchange.
- 𝐀𝐛𝐨𝐥𝐡𝐚𝐬𝐬𝐚𝐧 𝐉𝐚𝐥𝐚𝐥𝐢 — Iranian national; owner/operator of Jalali Exchange, which facilitated tens of millions of dollars for Iranian shadow-banking networks.
- 𝐄𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐲𝐞𝐡 𝐌𝐮𝐥𝐥𝐚𝐡 𝐌𝐨𝐡𝐚𝐦𝐦𝐚𝐝𝐢 — Iranian national; owner/operator of Jalali Exchange.

Entities:
- 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐃𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐥𝐨𝐩𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐁𝐚𝐧𝐤 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐈𝐧𝐯𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐅𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 — Iraq; provided Iran with U.S.-dollar access, handled Iranian capital, repatriated profits to Iran monthly, and maintained ties to Iranian state entities and Iran-aligned Iraqi militias.
- 𝐉𝐚𝐳𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐡 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐁𝐚𝐧𝐤 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 — Iran; Central Bank-approved offshore bank affiliated with Bank Mellat, conducting foreign-currency operations supporting sanctions evasion.
- 𝐂𝐡𝐚𝐛𝐚𝐡𝐚𝐫 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐁𝐚𝐧𝐤 𝐎𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐞𝐚𝐬 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 — Iran; offshore bank affiliated with Bank Shahr, supporting foreign-currency sanctions-evasion schemes.
- 𝐓𝐞𝐣𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐭 𝐆𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐫 𝐀𝐭𝐥𝐚𝐬 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐬𝐢𝐚𝐧 𝐊𝐢𝐬𝐡 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 — Iran; company managed and controlled by Razavi.
- 𝐅𝐚𝐫𝐳𝐚𝐧𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐧 𝐄𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐠𝐲 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐬 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 — Iran; Razavi-controlled company developing the Farzanegan Gas Condensate Refinery in Bushehr Province.
- 𝐄𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐬𝐩𝐡𝐞𝐫𝐞 𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐂𝐨., 𝐋𝐢𝐦𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐝 — Hong Kong; front company used by FSAQ to move funds through its rahbar broker network.
- 𝐒𝐞𝐲𝐲𝐞𝐝 𝐀𝐛𝐛𝐚𝐬 𝐇𝐨𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐢 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐬𝐚 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐐𝐞𝐬𝐡𝐦 𝐆𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩 — Iran; exchange house assisting sanctioned Iranian banks’ rahbar financial activity.
- 𝐒𝐨𝐡𝐞𝐢𝐥 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐒𝐨𝐫𝐮𝐬𝐡 𝐍𝐚𝐣𝐚𝐟𝐳𝐚𝐝𝐞𝐡 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 — Iran; exchange house processing hundreds of millions of dollars for Iranian institutions, including Bank Mellat-linked entities.
- 𝐀𝐛𝐨𝐥𝐡𝐚𝐬𝐚𝐧 𝐉𝐚𝐥𝐚𝐥𝐢 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐄𝐱𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 — Iran; exchange house facilitating tens of millions of dollars for shadow-banking networks and sanctioned rahbar entities.
- 𝐁𝐚𝐯𝐢 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐏𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐄𝐱𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲 — Iran; currency exchange house owned and operated by Sadegh Bavi.
- 𝐁𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐨 𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐜𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐝𝐞 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐞𝐫𝐜𝐢𝐨 𝐒.𝐀. — Cuba; designated by the State Department for operating in Cuba’s financial-services sector and providing services to designated Iran-based Karafarin Bank since at least 2022.

Key network mechanics:
- Iranian oil proceeds moved through Hong Kong to the UAE and Türkiye, where funds were converted into gold and cash and allegedly transported on Mahan Air flights to Iran and its proxies.
- FSAQ personnel coordinated transactions through Hong Kong- and UAE-based shell companies for NIOC, Triliance Petrochemical Company, and military-controlled Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company.
- IDB allegedly inherited capital from sanctioned Bank Melli’s closed Iraqi operation and exploited access to Iraq’s former U.S.-dollar wire auction.

Authorities and compliance impact:
- OFAC designations were imposed under E.O. 13902 for activity in Iran’s financial or petroleum sectors, or for acting on behalf of designated parties.
- BICSA was designated under Section 2(a)(i)(A) of E.O. 14404.
- U.S.-linked property is blocked and reportable; entities owned 50% or more by blocked persons are also blocked.
- Foreign financial institutions facilitating significant transactions for designated persons risk correspondent or payable-through account restrictions and secondary sanctions.
- No vessels, aircraft, digital-currency addresses, wind-down licenses, or new FAQs were announced.

Source: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0660/