The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on nine individuals and entities under its "Economic Fury" campaign, targeting networks that facilitate weapons procurement for Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) through China- and Hong Kong-based operations, including clandestine banking.

IRGC Procurement Network

Individuals:
- Liu Boyu (Chinese national): Sole director and president of Mustad Limited, facilitated millions in IRGC weapons transactions.
- Wang Hongyi (Chinese national): Mustad employee working on IRGC weapons procurement.
- Xu Lichun (Chinese national): Mustad employee supporting IRGC procurement operations.

Entities:
- Mustad Shanghai International Trade Co Ltd (Shanghai-based): Wholly owned subsidiary of previously designated Mustad Limited.
- Domus Trading HK Limited (Hong Kong-based): Operates within Iran's clandestine banking network, facilitates payments for Iranian blocked persons and weapons procurement.

MODAFL Procurement Network

Individuals:
- Manuchehr Golchin (China-based Iranian national): MODAFL defense acquisitions facilitator from China, chairman of Shangshun Hong Kong Ltd.
- Meng Shaopei (Chinese national): Managing director and 100% owner of Solos International Limited, accomplice of Golchin.

Entities:
- Solos International Limited (Hong Kong-based): Facilitates weapons procurement for MODAFL.
- Shangshun Hong Kong Ltd (Hong Kong-based): Oversees international partnerships under Golchin's direction.

Legal Authorities
- Executive Order 13382 (WMD proliferators): Liu Boyu, Xu Lichun, Wang Hongyi, Mustad Shanghai, Golchin, Meng, Solos, Shangshun.
- Executive Order 13902 (Iran financial sector): Domus Trading.
- Concurrent State Department sanctions on two Iran/Belarus entities under E.O. 13949.

Economic Fury Scope
The Treasury reports disrupting tens of billions in Iranian regime revenue through frozen cryptocurrency assets, shadow banking network crackdowns, shadow fleet vessel targeting, and oil trade blockade enforcement. Secondary sanctions risks identified for foreign financial institutions and China's "teapot" refineries supporting Iranian commerce.